This study investigates Australian federal politicians' expertise in and attitudes towards climate change. Telephone interviews were conducted with a sample of 26 Members of Parliament (MPs). Results of the survey, undertaken in late 2009, suggest that climate change expertise is low to moderate among MPs, and that there is no correlation between expertise in and concern about climate change. The survey reveals important differences in attitudes to climate change by party. About 40 per cent of Coalition (Liberal and National) MPs are climate change 'deniers', but no Labor Party (ALP) MPs are. ALP MPs rate climate change as the most important (with water management) out of four long-term challenges, but Coalition MPs rate it as the least important (after not only water, but also aging and defence). All ALP MPs think climate change demands urgent action, and that Australia should play a leadership role globally, but only about one-fifth of Coalition MPs does. Even those Coalition MPs who are climate change 'believers' tend to give lower importance to climate change than ALP MPs.
Introduction
Studies have shown that in Australia public levels of concern over climate change are high and there is a demand for government action (Akter & Bennett 2009 ). All major political parties went into the 2007 election supporting an emissions trading scheme (ETS), and in 2009 the Labor Government unveiled its version of such a scheme, the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS). There was strong resistance to the CPRS, but the Government negotiated with the Coalition Opposition on the design of the scheme to guarantee the Bill's passage through the Senate. Not long after a compromise agreement was reached (in late November 2009), the leader of the Opposition was ousted (on December 1, 2009 ) and replaced with one unwilling to accept an ETS in any form. Unable to pass the legislation, the Labor Government withdrew support for the CPRS, announcing that it would review the situation in 2012. During the 2010 Federal election, only the minority party, the Greens, advocated the immediate introduction of a price on carbon. Since its re-election, the now minority Labor Government appears to be favourably disposed to carbon pricing once again. This study is based on a survey that investigates federal MPs' expertise in and attitudes towards climate change, and the relationship between these. The study does not encompass specific policy areas where there are clear party lines (such as support for the CPRS), which would dictate answers. Instead it attempts to understand the attitudes of MPs, which not only reflect but ultimately determine policy. The survey was undertaken in the second half of 2009, while the compromise CPRS was being negotiated. After analysing the results, the paper attempts to link the survey's findings with the political turmoil surrounding the CPRS.
Theoretical approach
In this study, expertise does not imply belief. One can have high expertise in climate change, but be a climate change 'denier'. Such a person is familiar with climate change science, but rejects it. This distinction between being well-versed in, and actually accepting, climate change science is useful for the analysis which follows.
Belief in climate change science is one of three positive attitudinal areas covered by this study. The other two are resolvability and political importance. Three normative attitudes are also investigated: the urgency attached to dealing with climate change, the priority attached to it relative to other long-term issues, and the extent to which Australia has a global leadership responsibility. Views on urgency and priority are combined to define MPs' concern for climate change.
Apart from measuring MPs' expertise in and attitudes on climate change, the study also investigates the relationship between the two, and among attitudes. For example, are the better informed more concerned, and do those who view climate change as politically important attach more urgency to dealing with it? The study also examines whether the characteristics of the MPs (such as party affiliation, gender, age, education, and location of electorate) have a determining role in relation to both expertise and attitude. The , but media reporting in relation to climate change is often sensationalist and emotive but inaccurate (Weingart et al. 2000) . In the media, scientific uncertainties are often exaggerated in order to discredit findings-sometimes by lobby groups with vested interests (Stocking & Holstein 2009 ). By affording non-scientific industryfunded spokespeople and climate scientists equal exposure, the media gives equal credence to each and creates an informational bias-or a 'balance as bias' (Boykoff & Boykoff 2004) . Therefore, MPs' reliance on the media for climate change information would not suggest a high level of understanding.
Further, although research on politicians is scant, surveys suggest that the Australian public is knowledge-poor in relation to climate change (Bulkeley 2000 centre on the 'information-deficit model' (Dickson 2005 ) that suggests greater knowledge of a science should lead to greater acceptance of the implications of that science, and therefore greater willingness to act. However, this model has been challenged. Discussing the results of a survey of 1218 Americans, Bord et al. (2000) state that:
Concern over possible global warming impacts may be more a function of perceived risk from environmental pollution in general than of a precise understanding of the issue… The key may be an overall concern for the environment rather than a detailed understanding of global warming. (Bord et al. 2000, p. 206) So while some studies support the theory that 'accurate knowledge of global warming is the strongest single predictor of behavioural intentions' (Bord et al. 2000, p. 215) , another school of thought suggests that concern for climate change and accurate understanding of the science do not go together (Norgaard 2009 ).
The third hypothesis is that concern for climate change is a function of belief, political importance, and resolvability. The first is obvious: belief in climate change is necessary for there to be any concern about it. Perceptions of political importance are also likely to be linked to concern. Although the threat of climate change is gradual and invisible, the power of lobby groups and the voices of constituents can make it an issue of political salience. It is postulated that an MP who feels that climate change is an issue of political weight within the electorate, or one who believes that it will have a bearing on election outcomes, will assign more urgency to action. On resolvability, those who think climate change is a soluble problem are also more likely to prioritise it. As Sudhakara Reddy and Assenza (2009) (Curry et al. 2007 ).
Whether where an individual lives has any impact on their views of climate change is unclear. In one survey, regional location was not found to be a strong indicator of concern over climate change (Curry et al. 2007 ). Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006, p.81) , however, claim that location has an impact but only through where there was a possibility of increased house insurance premiums. In Hamilton and Keim's US study 'the three regions showing the highest levels of concern [for climate change] represent snow-country areas ' (2009, p. 2) . A study of residents of the US states of Michigan and Virginia also showed that local factors could have an important effect. If local industries are carbon-intensive, such as car manufacturing or mining, locals are less likely to be supportive of climate change policies (Shwom et al. 2008 ). Willinck's study of rural NSW and Victorian MPs concluded that 'approximately half the politicians interviewed doubted that climate change was human-induced' (Willinck 2009, p. 44) . Hamilton and Keim (2009) provide a potential explanation for the discrepancies in these findings.
They postulate that the overriding variable may be political orientation, which can also be highly localised.
Sample and survey
The research was conducted through a series of semi-structured interviews on a sample of MPs. Ministerial staff were not interviewed as responses from MPs and those of their senior aides can have significant differences (Clark et al. 2007 ).
2 A target of approximately 30 interviews was set. A systematic stratified sampling method was used.
The explicit strata used were the ALP, Liberal Party (LP), National Party (Nat) and Australian Greens (AG). The two smaller parties, the Nationals and the Greens, were deliberately over-sampled. Other minor parties and independents were excluded from the sampling frame.
Implicit strata were used to enhance accuracy. Within each party, MPs were ordered by their Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) classification as rural (R), provincial (P), outer metropolitan (OM) or inner metropolitan (IM). Within each AEC classification the MPs were ordered by state.
The total population of MPs of the 42 nd Parliament (without the minor parties) is 220, or about seven times 30. Therefore within the explicit strata, the lists were divided into consecutive groups of seven, starting on an MP selected randomly. To obtain a representative sample the recruitment strategy aimed to enlist one participant from each group. The sampling strategy was in part designed to reduce the impact of a high rejection rate. While several were contacted, only one MP was required from each subgroup of seven as defined in the sampling strategy. A total of 132 MPs were contacted. Of these 26 were interviewed. The key question is whether the high rejection rate (also a feature of the HoeghGuldberg et al. (2010) study) leads to sample bias. Table 1 compares the features of the sample with those of the population. The sample is representative of the population on most facets, although within the 40 to 60 age group the sample was biased towards the 51 to 60 age group. Also the recruitment strategy resulted in an under-representation of frontbenchers. This is unsurprising given how busy ministers and shadow-ministers are.
It is possible that those with strong or unorthodox views about climate change were either more or less willing to agree to participate in the survey, but unlikely. Only one MP withdrew once the anonymity clause was explained, claiming that the division of the sample by party made the results of such a survey too contentious for this MP's electorate. Nearly all those who rejected a request did so on the grounds that they were too busy. Obtaining ALP MPs was more difficult than Coalition MPs, which again is consistent with Government MPs being busier than Opposition ones. As is later noted, there is less variation in views among Government than Opposition MPs, making this under-sampling less problematic than it would otherwise have been.
In the end, a total of 26 interviewees were recruited, consisting of 11 ALP, 10 LP, 3
Nationals and 2 Greens. Weights were used to correct for over-sampling of the smaller parties, and for the fact that due to non-response ALP MPs were underrepresented. The weights applied to parties are shown in Table 2 . To what extent MPs gave their own views, as opposed to what they took to be the 'party line' is difficult to determine. The questions were selected to elicit individual views by avoiding specific policy questions on which there were clear party lines. However, it is possible that broader attitudes also reflect party views, which, as discussed later, could change over time.
Results
This section summarises results from the survey's closed (non-qualitative) questions.
All averages are calculated using the weights outlined in Table 2 .
Expertise
MPs were asked questions to test their climate change expertise or knowledge. They were also asked to rate their own knowledge. All MPs rated their level of knowledge of climate change science as either 'some' or 'good', with an almost even split between the two ( Table 3 ). The answers to the closed questions ( An expertise index ranging from one to six was devised based on the six questions.
Expertise ratings were then assigned. 'No expertise' corresponds to a score of 0, 'little expertise' to a score of 1 or 2, 'some expertise' to a score of 3 to 4 and 'good expertise' a score of 5 or 6. So, to avoid being rated as having little or no expertise, essentially an MP has to be able to answer correctly more than two out of six questions. While any assessment of knowledge must be subjective, this rating scheme does not seem harsh. Climate change 'deniers' are defined to be those who don't agree (strongly or moderately) that climate change is occurring, don't think it is a result (entirely or partly) of human activities, or believe the issue will likely go away by itself. Some 20 per cent fall into this category, all L&NP, as displayed in Table 5 . This equates to 43 per cent of sample L&NP MPs. Not surprisingly, a Student's t-test strongly rejects the hypothesis that there is the same proportion of deniers in both parties (the results are significant at the 1 per cent level).
ALP L&NPAG Total
Number of MPs 0 6 0 6
Percent of party 0 43% 0 20% 
Resolvability
Respondents were given a series of statements and asked to answer whether each eventuality was likely or unlikely. Generally MPs are optimistic about climate change ( Figure 3 ).
Figure 3: Resolvability views of all MPs
Analysis shows that all MPs who aren't deniers think that the problem of climate change can be solved, either through changes in human behaviour and/or through new technologies.
Political importance
On a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 is 'very important' and 1 is 'insignificant', 57 per cent of MPs rated climate change as a 4 or above in the last election. Considering the next election, 68 per cent gave the issue 4 or above in importance. In terms of importance to constituents to see government action on climate change, 53 per cent assigned a rating of 4 or above.
An index polimp, plotted in Figure 4 , is defined as the sum of the importance of the issue in the next election (1 to 5) and the importance to constituents to see government action on climate change (1 to 5). 
Concern: urgency and priority
A majority of MPs believe climate change is an issue for which it is necessary to take major steps very soon (64 per cent), a third believe that modest steps should be taken in coming years (32 per cent) and just four per cent don't believe that any steps need to be taken. To examine the priority that MPs give to climate change relative to other issues, respondents were asked to rate the importance of four long-term challenges on a 1-to-5 scale. Figure 6 shows the average score for the four different challenges by party. Water resource management is considered the long-term challenge of most importance (with an average score of 4.3), an aging population the second (average score of 3.8) The results for urgency and priority are combined to classify MPs on a scale of 1 to 3
for their concern for climate change. A rating of 3 (high concern) is assigned to MPs who believe climate change is an urgent issue for which it is necessary to take major steps very soon ( Figure 5 ) and who rate climate change as a top-priority long-term issue, assigning it a score no less than that of any of the other three long-term issues ( Figure 6 ). MPs rated 2 show medium concern. They believe climate change is an urgent issue for which major steps should be taken very soon, but they do not rate climate change as a top-priority long-term issue. A rating of 1 (low concern) is given for those who do not believe climate change is an issue for which it necessary to take major steps very soon.
As illustrated in Figure 7 a strong majority (78 per cent) of L&NP MPs have low concern for climate change, whereas both Green MPs demonstrate high levels of concern. Labor MPs are in between, with 27 per cent showing medium concern and 73 per cent high concern. Similarly, Table 7 shows that level of concern (measured by the concern variable from 1 to 3) has no link with expertise. Those with greater expertise do not necessarily demonstrate greater concern.
High concern Medium concern Low concern Total
Expertise index None or low (0-2) 7 3 7 17
Some (3-4) 2 1 3 6
Good (5-6) 1 1 1 3
Total 10 5 11 26 Table 7 : Expertise against concern (unweighted)
Influences of personal characteristics
Spearman rank correlations are used to investigate relationships between personal characteristics (party, gender, age, education, state, and urban-rural location) and each of the variables for concern, belief, resolvability, political importance and global responsibility (whether Australia should take a leadership role). (Table 5) Apart from correlations involving party affiliation, discussed earlier, only the correlation between gender and leadership is found to be significant. Female MPs are more likely to believe Australia should take a leadership role, globally. In fact 87.5 per cent of female MPs interviewed (7 out of 8) strongly agreed with this statement, whereas only 39 per cent of the males felt the same way. This probably reflects the fact that there is a higher ratio of women within the sample (and actual population) of Greens and ALP than Coalition ( Table 9 : Gender distribution of sample within parties
Determinants of climate change concern
It was hypothesised that belief in climate change science, the perception that climate change is politically important, and the view that climate change is resolvable will all contribute to an MP having a high concern for climate change action. It was also hypothesised that political affiliation would be a determinant of climate change
attitudes. These hypotheses are tested through the use of regression analysis. The '1 to 3' concern classification is employed as the dependent variable. The previously introduced dummy variable for belief and index of political importance are used as independent variables. Resolvability is not included in the analysis since, as discussed earlier, all MPs who believe in climate change science see it as resolvable. On the basis of the results from the correlation analysis presented earlier (Table 8) , among personal characteristics only the party variable is included in the regression analysis. Here, party is represented by a dummy variable equal to 1 for ALP or Green and 0 for the L&NP. Since the dependent variable for concern is ordinal, and there is more than one category, an ordered logistic regression (OLR) analysis is used. However, the model did not achieve convergence. It is suggested that this is because of quasi-complete separation that occurs because values of the urgency variable overlap at one value of the belief variable. That is, all the deniers are included in the '1' category for concern. Allison (2008) discusses how this type of problem often leads to non-convergence of logistic regressions. Clearly, all the climate change deniers have low concern for climate change, since they do not view it as a genuine problem. To circumvent the problem, the belief variable is interacted with the polimp variable to create an index that is 0 for deniers, and the value of the polimp for everyone else. This restriction is consistent with the survey data, which shows that all deniers are in the lowest category of concern for climate change. It also allows both variables (polimp and belief) to be included in the regression. We therefore estimate the equation
where C j is the probability that the an MP is in the jth or lower concern category, and j=1 or 2.
A chi-squared of 26.6 for 2 degrees of freedom resulted suggesting that the null hypothesis of an invalid model could be rejected at a confidence level of more than 99.9
per cent. The results, presented in Table 11 , show that the greater the political importance a non-denying MP attaches to climate change, the greater the likelihood he or she is of being in a higher concern category. They also show that, as we move from
Coalition to Labor, the likelihood of being in a higher concern category increases. Both variables were statistically significant to the 10 per cent or lower level. The party variable is significant at the 1 per cent level and has a greater impact. The results can be interpreted using odds ratios (calculated as the exponent of the coefficients in Table 9 ), which measure the relative odds of being in a higher concern category for different
groups. An ALP MP is 61 times more likely than a Coalition MP to show more concern, whereas a believing MP is 1.7 times more likely to show more concern if his or her score for political importance increases by one unit. The first hypothesis related to the level of MPs' expertise, which was predicted to be low based on surveys of the public. Sample MPs self-assessed their knowledge as moderate to good but predominantly displayed low to moderate expertise using the index developed in the paper. While any index will be subjective, the index developed in this paper is based on simple questions and can hardly be accused of setting the bar too high. As noted earlier, other surveys have also found that the expertise of Australians in relation to climate change is low (Bulkeley 2000; Socialdata Australia 2007; Fielding 2009 ). An analysis of the information sources used shows that 83 per cent of sample MPs rely on news media for their information on climate change. The literature suggests that reliance on the media is unlikely to lead to a high level of expertise (Stocking & Holstein 2009; Boykoff & Boykoff 2007 ).
The second hypothesis investigated the relationship between expertise on one side and climate change belief and concern on the other. Cross-tabulations for belief and concern against expertise show no relationship. Deniers are just as well-informed as believers, and it does not seem to hold that the highly-concerned endeavour to become more knowledgeable. This is consistent with the conclusions drawn by Bulkeley (2000) that the information-deficit model can be challenged in relation to climate change.
The third hypothesis suggested that concern towards climate change was driven by beliefs in climate change, and perceptions of political importance and resolvability.
Resolvability was ruled out as a determining factor, since it is an attitude held in common by all climate change believers. Through regression analysis it emerged that the other two factors are of relevance. were not opposed to a CPRS when the time was right were unlikely to be persuaded that the time was right in November/December 2009. Not surprisingly, when party support for CPRS was put to the test, it did not survive.
Consider now the ALP MPs. Given their high level of concern, how could the ALP have abandoned the CPRS? One obvious explanation is that it was a decision of the leadership rather than of the party-room. It is also possible that the survey overstates the commitment of ALP MP to act on climate change. Perhaps MPs were responding to these survey questions with what they perceived to be the party line. Another possible explanation is that one important variable had changed, namely, the perception of the political importance of climate change. After its rejection of the CPRS, the L&NP began to portray it as a 'big tax on everything' (Abetz 2010, p.303) . In this context, ALP MPs may have come to view action on climate change as a political risk (despite opinion polls continuing to show public support for such action) and therefore less important politically. In line with the regression results of Table 11 this would have weakened Labor support for strong action.
After the 2010 election, the returned Labor Government announced that it would once again support a carbon price (though not necessarily the CPRS). This was needed to gain support from a number of independent and Green MPs who came to hold the balance of power. It also seems consistent with the underlying views of Labor MPs as identified in this survey.
Conclusions
Although some findings are unsurprising, many of the survey results could not have been predicted-particularly the large and widespread differences in underlying attitudes towards climate change attitudes across party lines.
Casual observation reveals a much greater cross-party consensus on climate change in Europe than in either the United States or Australia. The May 2010 Conservative takeover of power in the UK, for example, is expected to make a big difference in economic policy, but not with regard to climate change. Why such a consensus has developed in some countries but not in others, and not in Australia, is a worthy subject for future research. 
